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A philosopher once wrote the following words: 
If I examine the PTOLOMAIC and COPERNICAN systems, I endeavour only, 
by my enquiries, to know the real situation of the planets; that is, in other 
words, I endeavour to give them, in my conception, the same relations, that 
they bear towards each other in the heavens. To this operation of the mind, 
therefore, there seems to be always a real, though often an unknown standard, 
in the nature of things; nor is truth or falsehood variable by the various ap- 
prehensions of mankind. Though all human race should for ever conclude, that 
the sun moves, and the earth remains at rest, the sun stirs not an inch from his 
place for all these reasonings; and such conclusions are eternally false and er- 
roneous.1 
1 David Hume, The Sceptic,' in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, 4 vols. 
ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (London: 1892-96; reprinted by Aalen: Scientia 
Verlag 1964) Vol. 3, 217-18 
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The essence of the philosophical view expressed in this passage is very 
simple, but is, I believe, also very profound. The philosopher I have 
quoted claims, in the first place, that whatever is the case is what it is 
quite apart from human conceptions and beliefs. He expresses this view 
by saying that 'truth or falsehood' is not Variable by the various ap- 
prehensions of mankind/ He illustrates this view by the example of the 
Ptolomaic system: even if human beings had always reached the conclu- 
sion that the sun goes around the earth, that would in no way change the 
fact that that belief is false. The second claim made by the philosopher I 
have quoted is an epistemological one. He characterizes the attempts of 
astronomers to discover the real positions of the planets as an 
'endeavour' to reproduce in their conception 'the same relations' that the 
planets have in reality. The philosopher presents this example as a model 
for all scientific enquiry. But he notes that it is 'often' the case that the 
real relations of things which we try to reproduce in our conceptions are 
based on an 'unknown standard.' In other words, human enquiry often 
proceeds without our having the ability to determine with any sort of 
certainty the relations of things in reality. Thus, the brief passage I have 
quoted gives not only a clear expression of a realist ontology, but also a 
suggestion of what may be called a sceptical epistemology. It is, I think, 
appropriate to give the label 'sceptical realism' to the overall 
philosophical view we find suggested here. 
The words I have just discussed were written by an eighteenth- 
century philosopher by the name of David Hume. They occur in an essay 
called 'The Sceptic' which Hume published in 1742, three years after his 
first philosophical work, A Treatise of Human Nature.2 The essay is one 
of four in which Hume sought to describe 'the sentiments of sects, that 
naturally form themselves in the world, and entertain different ideas of 
human life and of happiness.'3 (The others are called 'The Platonist,' 'The 
Stoic,' and The Epicurean.') There are good reasons to think that the 
views expressed in 'The Sceptic' are those of Hume himself.4 The essay 
2 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edition 
revised by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978); hereafter referred to 
as Treatise, followed by the page number. 
3 The Epicurean,' in Philosophical Works, Vol. 3, 197, n.l 
4 The account of human happiness described in the essay is closely connected with 
some of the conclusions reached in Hume's letter to an unknown physician (The 
Letters of David Hume, 2 vols. ed. J.Y.T. Greig [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1932] 
Vol. 1, 12-18). In this remarkable document Hume records his own personal 
failure to live by the maxims of the Stoic philosophy. In 'The Sceptic' Hume 
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espouses a form of moral scepticism which there is every reason to think 
that Hume himself adopted.5 The specific passage which I have quoted 
argues, in the first place, that our 'affections' are of such 'a very delicate nature, 
and cannot be forced or constrained by the utmost art or industry.' Secondly, he 
argues that in curbing our 'vicious passions' such maxims would also extinguish 
'such as are virtuous' and leave 'the mind totally indifferent and unactive' (224-5). 
5 In a recent book, David Norton argues that Hume rejects 'ethical or moral scep- 
ticism': the latter is defined as a view 'wherein the objectivity of moral distinc- 
tions is denied as a consequence of investigation into human motivation, belief, 
and action' (David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982), 244). It is difficult to know who, in 
Hume's time, held the view which Norton describes. Hume himself, at the begin- 
ning of his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, claims that those who 
deny the 'reality of moral distinctions' are entirely 'disingenuous' (Enquiries Con- 
cerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. 
L.A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition revised by P.H. Nidditch [Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1975], 169). He himself opposes moral sceptics who have inferred that all 
moral distinctions arise from education - but he goes on to argue that such a 
view (while not correct) is based on some genuine philosophical insights. Hume 
argues in opposition to the moral sceptic that 'any judicious enquirer' must admit 
that moral distinctions are 'founded on the original constitution of the mind.' 
Such an admission is made by those who think that virtue pleases 'either from 
considerations of self-interest, or from more generous motives and regards' 
(214-15; italics are mine). Norton's prime candidate for a moral sceptic is Hobbes. 
But Hume appears to recognize that Hobbes believed that moral distinctions are 
based in self-interest and are thus rooted in the original constitution of the 
human mind. For Hume criticizes Hobbes for holding an incorrect account of the 
original constitution of the mind. This is the upshot of his criticism of the Hob- 
bist state of nature in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (189). 
Moreover he argues that no man could ever behave in the manner of Hobbes' 
natural man (Treatise, 402). Hume's account of the Hobbist theory of 
benevolence is a bit peculiar (Enquiry Concerning ... Morals, 297), but at least it 
shows that Hume recognized that morality for Hobbes was based on an inference 
from the passions - not on education. I can find no evidence that Hume thought 
of Hobbes as a moral sceptic. 
Hume himself is a moral sceptic in a traditional sense. The ethical views of 
the Academics grew out of their criticisms of the principles of the Stoics; the ap- 
peal to what is in some sense natural was important both for Sextus Empiricus 
and Carnaedes (see Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in Sextus Em- 
piricus, 4 vols., trans. R.G. Bury [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1961] Vol. 1, 17; Cicero, Academica, in Cicero, 28 vols. trans. H. Rackham 
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1933] Vol. xix, 639). Hume adopted 
the view of the Academics, rather than the Pyrrhonists. Sextus notes that the 
former argue that 'it is more probable that what they call good is really good 
rather than the opposite, and so too in the case of evil, whereas when we [the 
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occurs in a section of the essay in which Hume supports this moral scep- 
ticism by the philosophical reflection that 'objects have absolutely no 
worth or value in themselves/ Rather, it is argued that value depends on 
'the particular fabric or structure of the mind' (The Sceptic/ 218-19). The 
contrast which Hume makes here between moral and aesthetic judgments 
on the one hand, and scientific ones on the other, is fundamental in his 
philosophy - and is repeated in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals. There he states that the standard of the former judgments lies in 
the 'peculiar nature' of the animal who makes them. However, our stan- 
dard in science is 'founded on the nature of things' and is 'eternal and in- 
flexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being/6 
Hume's faith in the existence of an external world which is wholly in- 
dependent of human belief will seem puzzling to many because he has so 
often been treated as a kind of cryptophenomenalist. For example, in 
Hume's Theory of the External World, H.H. Price asserted that Hume 
held the view that 'material objects consist entirely of "perceptions." '7 In 
this book and a well-known article entitled 'The Permanent Significance 
of Hume's Philosophy' Price provided a reconstruction of Hume's 
philosophy which attempted to expunge the sceptical elements.8 Hume's 
mistake, according to Price, was to retain an outdated conception of 
reason which left him thinking that our ordinary ways of determining 
causal relations were inadequate. Nevertheless, Price argued, Hume's 
philosophy could be reinterpreted so as to remove all talk of unknown 
standards. Other writers who have adopted Price's analysis have been 
less cautious in separating Hume's own views from those involved in the 
phenomenalist reconstruction of his philosophical thought. 
But the faith in an objective world which science seeks to discover 
also appears to be at odds with many interpretations of Hume as a scep- 
tic. Richard Popkin has written that Hume, following Pierre Bayle, 
adopted a 'new Pyrrhonism - a doubting of the real existence of 
everything, and an asserting that all that we could ever be acquainted 
Pyrrhonists] describe a thing as good or evil we do not add it as our opinion that 
what we assert is probable, but simply conform to life undogmatically that we 
may not be precluded from activity' (Sextus Empiricus, 139). 
6 Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 294 
7 H.H. Price, Hume's Theory of the External World (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1940), 223 
8 H.H. Price, The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy,' Philosophy 15 
(1940), 7-37 
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with were mental appearances/9 Popkin elsewhere argues that the Hume- 
an sceptic 'believes whatever nature leads him to believe, no more and no 
less'10; but there is no reason to think that the belief in scientific objectivi- 
ty expressed in The Sceptic' is merely a natural belief. Robert Fogelin has 
recently argued that Hume puts forward a 'theoretical skepticism' which 
is 'wholly unmitigated.' Fogelin maintains that Hume's only response to 
this Pyrrhonian scepticism is to show that it cannot be maintained in 
practice: 'we do not argue' to the mitigated scepticism which is adopted 
by Hume at the end of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.11 
If, as Fogelin implies, Hume had merely adopted a practical solution to 
sceptical doubts, this would hardly allow him to embrace the theoretical 
scientific realism which is espoused in the passages I have pointed out. 
In this paper I shall argue that the scepticism which Hume himself 
adopted requires a commitment to an objective world which is quite 
distinct from one which could be based on our perceptions. At the same 
time I shall argue that it is misleading to say that the Humean sceptic 
merely embraces beliefs which are imposed on us by human nature. The 
mitigated scepticism adopted by Hume himself involves a theory about 
the limits of human perceptions and the way that those limits are 
transcended by the suppositions which we all naturally make. I shall 
argue that, on Hume's view, these natural suppositions themselves pro- 
vide the raw material for correct scientific judgment. 
I Pyrrhonism in Hume's philosophy 
Let me begin by considering the suggestion of Richard Popkin that 
Hume adopted a kind of new Pyrrhonism. It is helpful to consider 
carefully how Pyrrhonian scepticism emerges in his philosophy. The 
classical description of this scepticism was given by Sextus Empiricus in 
9 R.H. Popkin, 'Berkeley and Pyrrhonism,' The Review of Metaphysics 5 (1951); 
reprinted in M. Burnyeat, ed., The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press 1983), 377-96, esp. 392. 
10 R.H. Popkin, 'David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism,' 
The Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1951); reprinted in V.C. Chappell, ed., Hume: a 
Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Doubleday 1966) 53-98, 95. 
11 Robert Fogelin, 'The Tendency of Hume's Skepticism,' The Skeptical Tradition 
397-412, esp. 399 & 410. 
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his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Scepticism, according to Sextus, is 'an abili- 
ty, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any 
way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the 
objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of 
mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude/12 
There are three elements involved in this initial description of scepticism: 
1. the opposition between what appears (phenomena) and what is 
thought or judged (noumena); 2. the suspension of judgment (epoche); 
and 3. the state of tranquillity (ataraxia). This initial description becomes 
more complex when Sextus goes on to allow that phenomena might be 
brought into opposition with phenomena or noumena with noumena. 
There is also some dispute among scholars as to just what Sextus means 
when he refers to phenomena or appearances here. Myles Burnyeat has 
recently pointed out that Sextus goes on to say that by phenomenon or 
appearance he means 'the impression (phantasia) of the thing that ap- 
pears/ Thus there are also impressions (phantasiai) of other things such 
as thoughts.13 This in fact reflects Hume's own use of the term 
'phaenomenon.' He employs the term sometimes to refer to the im- 
mediate contents of our senses (e.g., Treatise, 196, lines 14 & 29) and at 
other times to refer to the judgments we naturally make (e.g., Treatise, 
256, line 26).14 
In spite of these complications I believe that the most characteristic 
form of Pyrrhonian scepticism in Hume's philosophy may well be 
described in terms of the ability to oppose 'appearances to judgements.' 
We may reasonably identify the judgments with what Hume calls 'the 
sentiments of the vulgar' (Treatise, 223) or 'the reflections of common 
life.'15 In Hume's Treatise such natural judgments have their roots in that 
12 Sextus Empiricus, 7 
13 Myles Burnyeat, 'Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?' in M. Schofield, M. Bur- 
nyeat, J. Barnes, eds., Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic 
Epistemology (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980) 20-53, esp. 34. 
14 In Hume's own day the term was used mainly in the context of natural 
philosophy for whatever requires explanation. Indeed this seems to be the sense 
in which Hume uses the term - though his interest is mainly in moral rather 
than natural phenomena. I am indebted for these remarks to an unpublished 
paper by Mr. Tony Couture entitled 'A Study of Hume's Phaenomena in the 
Treatise.' 
15 David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in Enquiries Concern- 
ing Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd ed., ed. 
by L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975), 
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faculty of mind which he calls imagination. An example of such a 
noumenon is the judgment of men who 'in their common and careless 
way of thinking ... imagine they perceive a connexion betwixt such ob- 
jects as they have constantly found united together' (Treatise, 223). But 
this judgment is directly opposed to one we form on the basis of the way 
things actually appear to us - on the basis of phenomena, if you will. 
Hume denies that we have any impression or idea of a connection bet- 
ween objects. Hume claims that our ideas of cause and effect are entirely 
distinct and that therefore we have no perception of a connection or 
power in any object.16 Thus our natural judgment that we have a direct 
perception of power in objects is directly opposed to the examination of 
what appears; this reveals that we have no such perception. 
In order to understand what Hume calls 'the force of the Pyrrhonian 
doubt' {Enquiry, 162) it is important to fully appreciate the claims which 
ideas or phenomena make on us. It is certainly true, as Hume's contem- 
porary Thomas Reid maintained, that his scepticism is based on the 
development of the theory of ideas of his predecessors; however, Reid 
distorted that theory when he ascribed the view of ideas as entities to 
writers such as Descartes, Arnauld, and Locke.17 In its full generality the 
theory of ideas states that 'everything that is contained in the clear and 
distinct idea of a thing can truly be affirmed of that thing.'18 The essence 
of the theory lies in the claim that our knowledge of reality must be based 
on the analysis of our idea-contents.19 Hume's predecessors differed in 
their accounts of our clear and distinct ideas - but he himself proposed 
to resolve their disputes by what is commonly called his empiricist prin- 
162; hereafter this work will be referred to as Enquiry followed by the page 
number. 
16 Treatise, 79-80; cf. Enquiry 30, 63. 
17 See John W. Yolton, Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid (Min- 
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984). 
18 Antoine Arnauld et Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou L'Art de Penser (Paris: Flam- 
marion 1970), 388: Tout ce qui est contenu dans l'idee claire & distincte d'une 
chose, se peut affirmer avec verite de cette chose.' This sentence is mistranslated 
in A. Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, trans. James Dickoff and Patricia James (In- 
dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1964), 320. 
19 Hume thought that an examination of these contents would reveal that they do 
not give us any idea of 'independency' {Treatise, 191; cf . 194). But this is clearly 
not the view of Descartes or Locke. See John P. Wright, The Sceptical Realism of 
David Hume (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1983) 79-80, n.ll. 
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ciple. According to this principle, every meaningful term is based on an 
idea which has its source in some (internal or external) sense impression. 
Hume used this interpretation of the theory to argue that we lack ideas 
corresponding to the fundamental scientific notions of his day - those of 
absolute space and time {Treatise, 64-5), causal power (Treatise, 155-72; 
Enquiry, 60-79), and matter (Treatise, 226-31; Enquiry, 154-5). But it is 
not only philosophical or scientific notions which Hume thinks that we 
cannot comprehend; our ordinary notions of external existence and 
causality are also quite incomprehensible. Thus, for example, Hume 
employs his principle to establish that we are only directly aware of 
fleeting perceptions which cease to exist when unperceived - not exter- 
nal and independent objects. He uses the principle to establish that we 
only have ideas of contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction - 
not of the power by which the cause produces its effect. What we mistake 
for such objective power is merely a subjective impression of the mind. 
The appeal of Hume's analysis of our sense-derived ideas has been so 
convincing that many have thought that his own ontology was based on 
his version of the theory of ideas. But Hume himself thought that these 
analyses led to nothing but Pyrrhonian doubt. 
In order to see this we must also appreciate the opposing claims of the 
noumena - those of the reflections of common life. In his writings on 
the understanding, Hume identified certain suppositions which originate 
in that faculty of mind which he calls the imagination; in fact, we would 
be closer to the roots of Hume's own sceptical problem if we spoke of his 
theory of natural suppositions rather than (as is commonly done) of his 
theory of natural beliefs.20 Certain of these suppositions are clearly iden- 
tified with our ordinary view of things. For example, Hume says that 
almost everyone, including philosophers in their daily lives, 'take their 
perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, 
which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material ex- 
istence' (Treatise, 206; italics are mine). This direct realism is elsewhere 
20 For, strictly speaking, 'the idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it 
. . .' {Treatise, 94) and we have in fact no proper idea of those objects we naturally 
suppose. However, Hume extends his account of belief to 'fictions' - that is, to 
confused ideas; these fictions form the basis of our natural suppositions. Thus, 
for Hume, one can believe in external existence without having a clear idea of ex- 
ternal existence; one of the clear ideas which enters into our natural supposition 
of external existence is enlivened and thus the fiction is believed {Treatise, 208-9; 
cf. Michael Williams, 'Hume's Criterion of Significance,' Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 15 (1985), 273-304, esp. 283-4. 
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identified as that which the mind holds in its 'common situation' 
(Treatise, 213). Similarly Hume says that when 'the generality of 
mankind' experience the ordinary operations of nature they 'suppose 
that ... they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is 
connected with its effect' (Enquiry, 69; again, the italics are mine). These 
natural suppositions are directly opposed to what we discover on the 
basis of our sense-derived ideas. But, as we shall see, Hume thinks that 
they have some claim to give us a genuine account of reality. 
We can conclude therefore that Hume himself practices Pyrrhonian 
scepticism in so far as he opposes noumena and phenomena - what we 
in ordinary life suppose to be the case and that for which we have direct 
evidence through our ideas. These are totally opposed and entail entirely 
different accounts of what really is the case. 
But what are we to say of Hume's view of the other two components 
of Pyrrhonism - suspension of judgment (epoche) and tranquility 
(ataraxia)! Does Hume accept these two components of ancient Pyrrho- 
nian scepticism? It seems quite clear, as Terence Penelhum has recently 
stressed, that he does not.21 The Pyrrhonian claims that he can live 
without belief, making no assertion about external things;22 but this is 
what Hume denies that we can do. Hume does allow that 'a Pyrrhonian 
may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confu- 
sion by his profound reasonings' - but he denies that this condition can 
last any length of time.23 Hume denies the psychological validity of the 
Pyrrhonian sceptic's claim to withhold belief and judgment: 'Nature, by 
an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as 
well as to breathe and feel' (Treatise, 183). Hume also claims that, even if 
such a state were capable of being achieved, it would not lead to tran- 
quility or ataraxia. If the Pyrrhonists' principles were 'universally and 
steadily to prevail' then men would 'remain in a total lethargy, till the 
necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence' 
(Enquiry, 160). Hume clearly did not see Pyrrhonism as the road to hap- 
piness as did its proponents. 
The fact that Hume rejects these aspects of Pyrrhonism is quite im- 
portant. It indicates that whatever we might mean by calling Hume a 
21 Terence Penelhum, God and Skepticism (Dordrecht: Reidel 1983), 124ff. 
22 Sextus Empiricus, 11 
23 Enquiry, 160; cf . Hume's description of the results of Berkeley's philosophy at 
Enquiry, 155. 
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sceptic, this does not mean that he is agnostic regarding our fundamental 
ontological suppositions.24 According to Hume, it is impossible to 
withhold belief about such matters as the existence of an external world 
or the belief in causal powers. 
At the same time the fact that Hume rejects the possibility of the Pyr- 
rhonian suspension of judgment tells us less than is commonly thought 
about the nature of Hume's own scepticism. In acknowledging that 
nature forces us to judge, Hume certainly indicates some sort of accom- 
modation with the appearances. But this clearly does not mean what 
Richard Popkin has said it means - that the Humean sceptic believes on- 
ly what nature leads him to believe. For Hume's Pyrrhonian sceptic 
stresses that even the most reliable of our natural instincts 'may be 
24 In the final analysis this seems to be David Norton's interpretation of Hume's 
scepticism. According to Norton, Hume is said to be 'diffident about those 
beliefs' to which our natural propensities lead us {David Hume: Common-Sense 
Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, 202; cf . his 'Review of John P. Wright, The 
Sceptical Realism of David Hume,' Philosophical Books 25 [1984], 144-8). Nor- 
ton argues that according to Hume one can actively challenge a belief to which 
one cannot be hesitantly disposed and thus doubt and not doubt at the same time 
{David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, 288-9). The 
same view is espoused by Popkin in the article referred to in note 10 (95-6). But 
while Hume's academic sceptic is 'diffident' toward certain beliefs he is not diffi- 
dent to those fundamental beliefs to which our natural propensities lead us. It 
would be a mistake to interpret Hume as recommending in the last section of the 
Enquiry (161ff.) that we be hesitant in accepting beliefs such as the basic beliefs 
in causal connection or external existence. In his A Letter from a Gentleman to 
his Friend in Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1745; reprinted with an introduction by 
E.C. Mossner and J.V. Price [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1967]), 
Hume wrote that 'a Philosopher who affects to doubt of the Maxims of common 
Reason, and even of his Senses, declares sufficiently that he is not in earnest...' 
(19). 
I believe that the doubting activity, which Norton in fact reduces to a mental 
disposition, should be identified with the activity of reason: for reason is capable 
of discovering the falsity of certain aspects of those beliefs which we hold on the 
basis of a natural propensity. Reason shows us that we lack evidence for our 
natural suppositions. It is true that Hume sometimes suggests that such reflection 
briefly leads us to a complete suspension of judgment. Thus, as Penelhum points 
out, in characterizing the results of his inquiries Hume describes himself as being 
'hesitant and dogmatic by turns' {God and Skepticism, 124). But the point I wish 
to make is that this does not represent the final position on scepticism either in 
the Treatise or the Enquiry. For, unlike Malebranche and Berkeley, Hume rejects 
reason as the basis for our fundamental ontology; its positive function is to cor- 
rect the ontology rooted in our natural suppositions. 
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fallacious and deceitful' (Enquiry, 159). Indeed, he claims to show that 
our most natural suppositions about external existence and causality are 
false.25 Moreover, Hume himself does not purport to be able to live in ac- 
cordance with the appearances - even when it is acknowledged that 
such a life includes some belief. For while he recommends backgammon 
and social life in order to dispel the gloomy clouds of Pyrrhonism, he 
reports that his own natural inclination to philosophy returns shortly 
after he indulges in these pursuits (Treatise, 269). Philosophy is described 
as an activity which assigns 'causes and principles to the phaenomena, 
which appear in the visible world/ In the conclusion to Book I of the 
Treatise Hume even suggests that the fact that men's minds are inclined 
toward superstition leads him to enquiries 'without the sphere of com- 
mon life' (Treatise, 271; but see note 33 below). At the end of his discus- 
sion Hume affirms his goal of establishing 'a system or set of opinions, 
which if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hop'd for) might at 
least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the 
most critical examination (Treatise, 272; italics are mine). 
It is remarkable that the view has prevailed that Hume is a Pyrrho- 
nian sceptic - especially in his Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's cen- 
tral aim in that work is to construct a science of man based on ex- 
perimental method. At the beginning he rejects the claims of those who 
put forward their hypotheses as 'certain principles' (Treatise, xviii). His 
own central principles - such as the empiricist principle and the princi- 
ple of association of ideas - are put forward at the outset of Book 1 in a 
quite tentative way. It is quite significant that, immediately after in- 
troducing the former principle, Hume allows an exception to it (Treatise, 
5-7; cf. Enquiry, 20-1). On the other hand, Sextus Empiricus notes that 
'the Pyrrhonian philosopher' makes it a rule to assent 'to nothing that is 
non-evident.' He does not dogmatize, where dogmatizing means assent- 
ing to things which are not absolutely certain (Sextus Empiricus, 11). 
This is clearly the methodological rule adopted by Descartes in his first 
Meditation - not that adopted by Hume either in his Treatise or his En- 
quiry Concerning Human Understanding. Both in the Introduction to the 
Treatise and in the conclusion to Book 1 Hume indicates his willingness 
to accept principles which are not absolutely certain. 
25 Treatise, 213 (lines 15-17), 223 (lines 22-5) 
417 
John P. Wright 
II Hume's mitigated scepticism or Academical Philosophy 
The scepticism which Hume himself adopted is clearly identified in the 
last section of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding as a 
'mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy' (Enquiry, 161). While 
there has always been much dispute about the nature of the original 
academic scepticism26 there are statements in both Cicero and Sextus Em- 
piricus which clearly distinguish it from Pyrrhonian scepticism. Cicero 
writes that 'the sole object' of the Academic discussions is 1?y arguing on 
both sides to draw out and give shape to some result that may be either 
true or the nearest possible approximation to the truth.'27 The Academics 
attempt to rid the mind of what they call 'the act of assent, that is of mere 
opinion and hasty thinking' {Academica, 607). But both Sextus and 
Cicero stress that while the Academics reject knowledge in the form of 
the Stoic cataleptic impressions they accept those which are 'probable.'28 
Cicero notes that while these probabilities are 'not grasped (non com- 
prehensa) nor perceived nor assented to/ they 'possess verisimilitude' 
{Academica, 595). They provide the Academic philosopher 'with a canon 
of judgement both in the conduct of life and in philosophical investiga- 
tion and discussion (in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo)' 
(Academica, 509). 
An echo of this latter claim of Cicero appears in Hume's Abstract 
when he declares that a central aim of his logic is to explain 'probabilities, 
and those other measures of evidence on which life and action intirely de- 
pend, and which are our guides even in most of our philosophical 
speculations.'29 In the Treatise Hume distinguishes both a wider and nar- 
rower sense of the term 'probability' (Treatise, 124); in the Abstract he is 
clearly using it in the wider Ciceronian sense to label those measures of 
evidence which do not constitute knowledge. This is the sense in which 
Locke used the term in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
when he characterized 'Probability' as an agreement or disagreement of 
26 See, for example, Gisela Strieker, 'Sceptical Strategies,' Doubt and Dogmatism, 
54-83. 
27 Cicero, Academica, 475 
28 Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 139; Academica, 507-9; see Charlotte Stough, Greek 
Scepticism (Berkeley: University of California Press 1969), Chapter 3, esp. 40. 
29 David Hume, An Abstract ofa... Treatise of Human Nature, in David Hume, A 
Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed., ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P.H. Nidditch, 
647. 
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ideas whose connection is not 'constant and immutable, or at least is not 
perceived to be so'; in probabilities, according to Locke, the connection 
between ideas is sufficient 'to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to 
be true, or false, rather than the contrary/30 The central aim of Hume's 
works on the understanding was to show that we are induced to accept 
such measures of evidence - not because we have an obscure under- 
standing of the connection of the ideas - but because of the mechanical, 
irrational, and unconscious operations of the imagination.31 Hume 
argues that our supposition of the existence of causal connections bet- 
ween those objects which we call cause and effect is not comprehended, 
to use the Ciceronian term. At the same time he argues that it is firmly 
rooted in the principles of imagination and obtains thereby some 
epistemic validity. Hume accepted the Ciceronian claim - endorsed and 
interpreted by Locke and the Royal Society32 - which gives credibility 
to what is probable. 
The academic sceptic, unlike the Pyrrhonian, argues both sides of the 
question in order to obtain some positive result. In Hume's version of this 
philosophy, this requires that the claims of both the phenomena and the 
noumena need to be modified. In his Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding Hume says that in the academic philosophy the 'un- 
distinguished doubts' of the Pyrrhonian 'are, in some measure, corrected 
by common sense and reflection' (Enquiry, 161). This clearly indicates 
that the realm of doubt is to be limited by giving credibility to the 
noumena. But these common-sense reflections must in turn be corrected 
by the reflections on the nature of our ideas which originally led to the 
30 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1979), Book 4, Chapter 15, Section 1; Hume adopts 
Locke's distinction between constant and inconstant connections in Book I, Part 
III, Sect. I of the Treatise. 
31 For a discussion of the relation of Hume's and Locke's views on of probability see 
John P. Wright, 'Association, Madness, and the Measures of Probability,' in 
Christopher Fox, ed., Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century (New 
York: A.M.S. Press, forthcoming). 
32 See Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century 
England (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983), Chapter 2; also Douglas 
L. Patey, Probability and Literary Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1984), Part I, esp. 13-34. On the use of Cicero in the development of earlier 
modern ideas of probability see Lisa Jardine, 'Lorenzo Valla: Academic Skep- 
ticism and the New Humanist Dialectic,' in M. Burnyeat, ed., The Skeptical 
Tradition, 253-86. 
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unlimited doubts of the Pyrrhonian. Hume writes that 'philosophical 
decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and 
corrected' (Enquiry, 162). In order to understand the nature of Hume's 
academic scepticism we need to understand just how the phenomena and 
the noumena modify each other. 
As I have indicated, Hume thinks that if we could allow our sense- 
derived ideas to have unlimited sway over our beliefs we would be led to 
an absolute scepticism. We would be led, as were Malebranche and 
Berkeley (respectively), to deny finite causal connections and the ex- 
istence of anything independent of our perceptions. But Hume thinks 
that we can limit the doubts engendered by these new proponents of 
divinity or school metaphysics by acknowledging the 'narrow capacity of 
human understanding' (Enquiry, 162). This means, in part, that we must 
limit the subject matter on which we are to pass judgment - though 
Hume's view on this varies in different writings.33 But it also means, 
more significantly, that we must reject all ontological claims based pure- 
ly on the evidence of our sense-derived ideas. Thus, according to Hume, 
the claims of our sense-derived ideas cannot be accepted without 
qualification except in the realm of 'quantity or number' (Enquiry, 165). 
Instead of concluding that there is no connection between cause and ef- 
fect, Hume says that we need to recognize that we have 'no adequate idea 
of power or efficacy in any object' (Treatise, 160). Elsewhere in the 
Treatise Hume speaks of a 'deficiency in our ideas' (267); and in the En- 
quiry Concerning Human Understanding he says that we need to 
recognize that our ideas of cause and effect are 'imperfect' (76). Thus, the 
realm of doubt is limited in Hume's academic philosophy by maintaining 
that our ideas do not give us just representations of reality. 
In rejecting the reality-claims of our ideas besides those of quantity 
and number Hume was rejecting knowledge. For Hume, like his 
predecessors, held that knowledge must depend 'solely upon ideas' 
(Treatise, 70). He makes the adequacy of our ideas a condition for 
knowledge (Treatise, 29). Since Humean ideas (apart from those of 
33 The second form of mitigated scepticism identified in the Enquiry is one in which 
the mitigated sceptic 'confines' his judgment to 'common life' (162). This scep- 
ticism is in fact more extreme than that of the Treatise where, as we have seen 
(417 above) Hume is willing to go beyond common life in order to combat 
superstition. In The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (174-5) I have argued that 
Hume returns to the less extreme form of scepticism in his Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion; it is only because he does so that he is able to carry off his 
radical critique of natural theology in that work. 
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reflection) are derived from the senses it follows that in denying their 
adequacy Hume was denying that the evidence of our senses provides a 
basis for our accounts of what is really the case. Hume was rejecting the 
ontological claims of the modern day equivalents of the Stoic cataleptic 
impressions - clear and distinct ideas. 
The ontological claims of Hume's academic philosophy arise from an 
entirely different source - namely the inconceivable suppositions which 
are rooted in the imagination. Hume maintained that 'the imagination' is 
'the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy' (Treatise, 225); it is this 
faculty which plays the fundamental role in the project announced in the 
Introduction to the Treatise of Human Nature - that of founding the 
other sciences on that of human nature. It should be understood that this 
project forms an essential part of Hume's academic scepticism, for it is an 
attempt to show that probable suppositions - not clear and distinct 
ideas - form the basis for the claims of experimental philosophy. At the 
same time, the probable suppositions which the academic sceptic accepts 
are not merely the unexamined claims of the imagination. As Sextus Em- 
piricus noted, the academics made a distinction between different pro- 
babilities: 'some they regard as just simply probable, others as probable 
and tested, others as probable, tested' and 'thoroughly inspected.'34 It is 
claims of this latter sort which form the basis of those positive views 
which we find in Hume's own philosophy. 
Ill Hume's account of external existence 
It will be thought by many that the interpretation of Hume's philosophy 
which I am outlining here is incompatible with his account of external ex- 
istence. While I believe that Hume's realist epistemology is best ex- 
emplified in his account of causality I hold that its essentials are also pre- 
sent - though in a less clear way - in his account of external existence. 
Thus, before turning to Hume's account of causality I shall show how 
Hume's theory of inconceivable suppositions applies to what he says 
about external existence. 
It is important to distinguish three quite distinct views of external ex- 
istence which find their way into Hume's analysis. 1. In the first place 
34 Sextus Empiricus, 139-41; in using this last phrase I am employing the translation 
suggested at the bottom of page 140. 
421 
John P. Wright 
there is the view of all of us who in our unreflective moments suppose 
that our sensible perceptions continue to exist while unperceived and are 
therefore themselves external objects. 2. In the second place there is the 
'double existence' theory which 'generally speaking' is supposed by 
philosophers. According to this theory, sensible impressions represent 
external objects which are not themselves directly perceived. On this 
view it is these external objects which are supposed to exist while 
unperceived. But they are not supposed to be 'specifically different' from 
perceptions. They are, according to Hume, only thought to have 'dif- 
ferent relations, connexions, and durations' (Treatise, 68). 3. Finally 
there is the 'double existence' theory which is based on the 'fundamental 
principle of modern philosophy' - that 'colours, sounds, tastes, smells, 
heat and cold' are 'nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv'd from the 
operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the 
qualities of the objects' (Treatise, 226). I believe that it is this theory 
which Hume has in mind when he talks about supposing a specific dif- 
ference between perceptions and objects (Treatise, 68). The first two 
theories are discussed in the chapter of the Treatise entitled 'Of scepticism 
with regard to the senses'; Hume begins the chapter by saying that this 
notion of external existence 'when taken for something specifically dif- 
ferent from our perceptions' is absurd (Treatise, 188). Nevertheless, he 
does go on to discuss this theory (our third one) in the chapter entitled 
'Of the modern philosophy.' There is a similar division between Hume's 
discussions of the first two theories and the third at the end of part 1 of 
Section XII of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 
Let me begin my discussion by considering this third theory of exter- 
nal existence. It is wrong to say that Hume dismisses this theory, as is so 
commonly thought. It is true that, on Hume's view, this theory 'has little 
or no influence on practice'; at the same time he says that it is 'to be 
regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences' 
(Treatise, 469). Moreover, it is clear that Hume holds that the theory has 
a solid basis in our experimental reasoning. After describing the relevant 
observations Hume writes that the conclusion that colours, sounds, etc. 
are 'nothing but internal existences' which 'arise from causes, which no 
ways resemble them' is 'as satisfactory as can possibly be imagin'd' 
(Treatise, 227). Finally it is clear in some sense that we all are able to sup- 
pose what it would be like for this theory to be true: there would have to 
be independently existing primary qualities - extension, solidity, and 
motion - without any secondary ones. 
However, Hume follows Berkeley in arguing that we cannot form 
any idea of such an object; for it is, say these writers, impossible to con- 
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ceive primary qualities without secondary ones. The problem is that the 
primary qualities are only conceived by abstraction and hence cannot, 
according to what Hume calls the 'establish'd maxim in metaphysics' 
(Treatise, 32), represent things or substances. Thus we are left with the 
notion of something which is related to our perceptions as the cause of 
them - but of which we cannot form any idea: The farthest we can go 
towards a conception of external objects, when suppos'd specifically dif- 
ferent from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without 
pretending to comprehend the related objects' (Treatise, 68). Thus at the 
end of the section 'Of the modern philosophy' we appear to be left in the 
utmost scepticism regarding the external object (Treatise, 231). It is im- 
possible to conceive of such a thing. 
For Berkeley, that is the end of the matter. However, I think there is 
good reason to think that this is not true for Hume. After presenting this 
argument in his Enquiry Hume notes that it is 'drawn from Dr. Berkeley' 
and claims that it is 'merely sceptical' in that it admits of 'no answer and 
produce [s] no conviction (Enquiry, 155). That doesn't tell us whether the 
fundamental principle of modern philosophy is true or false. But the 
direct parallel which Hume draws between this principle and his own 
principle that moral virtue and vice are not qualities in objects (Treatise, 
469) suggests that the former theory as well as the latter has a clear 
significance in his own philosophy. Moreover, as we have seen, Hume 
states that we 'may suppose ... a specific difference betwixt an object and 
impression' even where we cannot conceive one (Treatise, 241). Thus, it 
seems that we may suppose matter to exist solely with primary qualities 
even though we cannot conceive it to exist in this way. And we have 
good reason to make this supposition given that, according to Hume, the 
theory is based on a systematic application of the principle of cause and 
effect (cf. Treatise, 231 - last paragraph). 
Hume's remarks on this theory are too paradoxical to allow us to 
come to any definitive interpretation of his own views. It is clear 
however that the most fundamental theory of external existence - that 
which we all hold prior to any philosophical reflection - also depends 
on a supposition that external objects have different properties than our 
sensible perceptions or impressions. This may seem to be a puzzling 
claim since that theory makes no distinction between the impressions and 
external objects: as I mentioned earlier Hume thinks that in the uncritical 
state of mind in which we accept that theory we 'suppose, that the very 
being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or 
material existence' (Treatise, 206). But Hume also holds that we are sup- 
posing what is not really the case. Direct realism is false. For, as a matter 
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of fact, the immediate objects of our sense perception cease to exist as 
soon as they are not perceived.35 However, Hume sometimes 
characterizes this common-sense assumption in more neutral terms: we 
provide a continuity for our experience 'by supposing that ... interrupted 
perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible' 
(Treatise, 199). In this general form the supposition is not false - for the 
real existence which connects our perceptions need not be the continuing 
existence of the perception itself.36 And, of course, what we are really do- 
ing (though we are not reflectively aware of it) is ascribing a property 
(continuing existence) to the object, which our impressions do not 
possess. The fact that Hume stresses that the principles by which we 
ascribe an unperceived existence are 'conducted by such false supposi- 
tions' (Treatise, 217) should not blind us to the fact that they also lead us 
to make a true one. Toward the end of Book I of his Treatise Hume 
speaks of an 'irregular kind of reasoning from experience' which makes us 
'discover a connexion or repugnance betwixt objects, which extends not 
to impressions.' He cites as an example his earlier account of the ascrip- 
tion of unperceived existence on the basis of the 'coherence of our percep- 
tions' (Treatise, 242). In that account he had noted that 'we suppose' that 
'objects still continue their usual connexion' even when they are 
unperceived and that 'irregular appearances' (such as the sound of a 
creaking door without the visual impression of the door) 'are join'd by 
something, of which we are insensible.' In forming this 'simple supposi- 
tion of their contin'd existence' (Treatise, 198) we still make a mistake in 
so far as 'we confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a continu'd 
existence to the very things [we] feel or see' (Treatise, 193). However, 
there is still something correct about our natural supposition of con- 
tinued existence.37 
35 Treatise, 210 (lines 10-15); Treatise, 217 (lines 30-5); Enquiry, 152 (lines 28-32) 
36 Compare my The Sceptical Realism of David Hume, 55-6. I have given an ex- 
tended analysis of Hume's account of our belief in external existence in Chapter 
2. For reasons which emerge in the present paper I am now less inclined to call 
Hume's theory of perception a representative one than I was when I wrote this 
chapter. Hume certainly holds an indirect theory of perception: but it is impor- 
tant to note that, according to him, one cannot simply read off the features of 
reality from our ideas and impressions. 
37 The centrality of 'suppositions' in Hume's account of external existence was sug- 
gested to me in reading through Chapter IX of John Yolton's Perception Acquain- 
tance from Descartes to Reid (see especially the section entitled 'Suppositions and 
False Beliefs' [173-6]). But I think that suppositions play a wider role in Hume's 
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This is apparent from Hume's treatment of the theory to which 
philosophers generally subscribe. According to this theory, perceptions 
represent external objects which cause and resemble them. Hume claims 
that this theory arises from the rational criticism of the common sense 
theory - when we discover that our immediate sense perceptions are 
mind-dependent existences. Thus philosophers - including Hume38 - 
distinguish 'betwixt perceptions and objects, of which the former are sup- 
pos'd to be interrupted, and perishing, and different at every return; the 
latter to be uninterrupted, and to preserve a continued existence and iden- 
tity' (Treatise, 211). But Hume stresses that his belief in a double ex- 
istence of perceptions and objects has no independent evidence to sup- 
port it and that it is itself dependent on the natural supposition which led 
to the view of common sense. That is to say that the philosopher has no 
basis for a supposition that anything exists while unperceived except the 
principle of the imagination which originally led us to suppose the conti- 
nuing existence of our perceptions themselves. Moreover, philosophers 
generally rely on other principles of imagination which make us 'suppose 
our objects ... to resemble our perceptions' and that the former cause the 
latter (Treatise, 217). Hume holds that the true philosopher needs to cor- 
rect at least the first of these two natural suppositions but insofar as he 
himself accepts any of the features of this representative system he is still 
dependent on the suppositions of common sense. Even though this 
system cannot claim the direct evidence of our impressions and ideas it is 
based on a rational correction of the natural propensities of the imagina- 
tion. 
Each of the theories of external existence which Hume considers in- 
volves a supposition that objects are, in some sense, different from their 
corresponding impressions. As I pointed out at the beginning of this 
discussion, I do not think that Hume's own realist epistemology emerges 
ontology than Yolton may originally have realized and that it is important to 
recognize that, according to Hume, suppositions of the imagination rather than 
genuine sense-derived ideas provide the basis for our ontology. 
38 Treatise, 67 (lines 20-4), 239 (line 23-6); Enquiry, 152 (lines 18-22). On page 202 
of the Selby-Bigge edition of the Treatise Hume tells his reader that he will tem- 
porarily withhold this distinction in order to accomodate himself to the thinking 
of the vulgar; the distinction is reintroduced on page 211. Compare John 
Passmore, Hume's Intentions, revised edition (London: Duckworth 1968), 90-1; 
Anthony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief, (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul 1961), 47; N. Kemp Smith, The Naturalism of David Hume,' Mind 14 
(1905) 149-73, 335-47, esp. 169-70. 
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perfectly clearly from his accounts of our supposition of external ex- 
istence. However, it should be noted that in each of these accounts he 
stresses that our belief in external existence involves suppositions which 
cannot be based on the evidence of our senses and reason. Indeed, ac- 
cording to Hume, an examination of our sense-derived ideas reveals that 
external existence cannot be clearly and distinctly conceived. Never- 
theless, Hume himself observes a distinction between objects and percep- 
tions throughout his writings on human understanding and such a 
distinction, insofar as it is presupposed by his own claims about the defi- 
ciency of our ideas, lies at the root of his academic scepticism. 
IV The Supposition of Necessary Causal Power 
The complexities and paradoxes contained in Hume's account of external 
existence leave one with no very clear picture of the role which these sup- 
positions play in his own epistemology. The clearest development of the 
theory is in his account of our causal inferences. 
Hume's scientific methodology has commonly been interpreted as a 
kind of 'observationalism' which denies that 'unobservables' have any 
place in scientific enquiry. In an interesting recent article, J.P. Monteiro 
has argued persuasively that unobservable 'powers and qualities' play an 
important role in Hume's own science of human nature. But Monteiro 
still endorses the view that Hume's theory of 'causal inference' involves 
no more than an inference from past observations to future ones.39 This 
does not seem to me to be correct. It is the very essence of our causal in- 
ferences and judgments, as analyzed by Hume both in the Treatise and 
the Enquiry, that they take us beyond our perceptions and make us sup- 
pose that there are caus&l powers in objects. 
In section I of this paper I pointed out a passage from the Enquiry in 
which Hume claims that in ordinary life we suppose that we actually 
perceive the force or energy by which the cause is connected with its ef- 
fect. Later on in the same section he identifies this as the supposition that 
there is a necessary connection between the cause and the effect: '... 
When one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been 
conjoined with another, we ... call the one object, Cause; the other, £/- 
39 J.P. Monteiro, 'Hume's Conception of Science/ Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 19 (1981), 327-42 
426 
Hume's Academic Scepticism 
feet. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some 
power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates 
with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity' (Enquiry, 74-5). This 
natural supposition is based on a feeling we have when we have ex- 
perience two events as constantly conjoined. As a result of an association 
of ideas one 'feels these events to be connected in his imagination' (En- 
quiry, 75-6). This feeling of inseparability of the two events is not the 
recognition of a logical connection between them - but it makes us form 
a judgment which is equivalent to one which we would have if we actual- 
ly apprehended such a logical inseparability. In his Treatise Hume 
writes: Tis natural for men ... to imagine they perceive a connexion be- 
twixt such objects as they have constantly found united together; and 
because custom has render'd it difficult to separate the ideas, they are apt 
to fancy such a separation to be in itself impossible and absurd' (Treatise, 
223). Indeed, as Kant pointed out in his Prolegomena, Hume thinks that 
we mistake 'a subjective necessity' arising from custom and habit for 'an 
objective necessity arising from insight.'40 But, however confused the 
judgment, the result is the same. We naturally suppose that there is an 
objective necessity linking those events which we have constantly ex- 
perienced in succession.41 
How then does the academic philosopher's view of causality differ 
from that of common sense? As we have seen, in both the Enquiry and 
Treatise, Hume stresses that the common man supposes that he actually 
perceives the power or necessary connection which links the effect to the 
cause. But the academic philosopher, who has analyzed his impressions 
and ideas, knows that this is false. He knows that the connection which 
the common man ascribes to the objects is not perceived. Hume writes 
that '... Philosophers, who abstract from the effects of custom, and com- 
pare the ideas of objects, immediately perceive the falshood of these 
vulgar sentiments, and discover that there is no known connexion among 
objects' (Treatise, 223; italics are mine). Still, the academic philosopher 
(who seeks to found the sciences on the principles of the imagination 
40 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, translation revised by 
L.W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1950), 6 
41 In this paragraph I have outlined one of Hume's accounts of our belief in objec- 
tive necessity. This coincides with one of two accounts which Hume presents in 
his Treatise. For a more complete description of Hume's theories and an account 
of the historical roots of the theory presented here see Wright, The Sceptical 
Realism of David Hume, 151-4. 
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'which are permanent, irresistable, and universal'42) gives credence to the 
basic natural principle on which the common man's belief is based. He 
recognizes that without the natural supposition we will be driven to the 
absurd view that there are no causes in the universe. Thus the proponent 
of what Hume calls the 'true philosophy' returns to 'the sentiments of the 
vulgar' insofar as he ascribes a causal power to the object whenever he 
discovers a regular succession. However, he recognizes that he has no ac- 
tual perception of the power by which the events are necessarily con- 
nected (Treatise, 222-3). 
It is easy to read into some of Hume's remarks the view that there is 
no genuine connection in objects. But I believe that this is a mistake. In 
the passage I have just discussed Hume also contrasts the view of the true 
philosophy with that of a 'mistaken knowledge' and he says that the pro- 
ponents of the latter continue to seek for 'a natural and perceivable con- 
nexion ... in matter, or causes.' He says that they 'seek for it in a place, 
where 'tis impossible it can ever exist.'43 Is Hume not saying that 
necessary connection and power cannot exist in objects? In fact, the error 
he is ascribing to the false philosophers is based on the fact that they con- 
tinue to seek for a perceivable connection in objects. What cannot exist 
in objects is anything corresponding to the actual idea we have. What the 
proponent of the false philosophy fails to recognize is that 'we have no 
idea of power, or agency, separate from the mind and belonging to 
causes' (Treatise, 223; my italics). For the actual idea we have is merely 
based in a subjective feeling of constraint which arises from the mind's 
own mechanisms. But this does not mean that there can be no power or 
necessary connection in objects. Hume himself says that he is quite will- 
ing to allow that 'there may be several qualities both in material and im- 
material objects, with which we are utterly unacquainted.' (He even talks 
of 'meaning these unknown qualities.'44) Indeed this is an acknowledge- 
42 There is really a two stage process by which the academic philosopher's view is 
obtained. In the first place Hume claims that his view, unlike the view of ancient 
philosophers, is based on principles of imagination which have the natural 
characteristics cited here. But this is also true of vulgar belief. In order to reach 
what is distinctive in the academic philosopher's view a further refinement is 
necessary - namely an examination of the nature of our ideas through reason. 
43 Treatise, 223; it is important to note that the grammatical reference of the pro- 
noun 'it' in the second last line on this page is 'a natural and perceivable connex- 
ion.' Similarly at Treatise, 168 that which Hume says 'is incompatible with those 
objects, to which we apply it' is 'something, of which we have a clear idea.' 
44 Treatise, 168; my italics. In this passage Hume is clearly using the term 'meaning' 
428 
Hume's Academic Scepticism 
ment which must be made by the true philosopher who seeks to base his 
fundamental ontology on the same principles of the imagination which 
originally led to the view of the vulgar - not on representative ideas.45 
The importance of the academic philosopher's commitment to the ex- 
istence of an unperceived necessary connection is clear in a brief account 
of scientific method which Hume presents both in his Treatise and in his 
Enquiry. According to this account, scientific investigation has its begin- 
nings in those cases where a previously observed regularity fails to hold. 
In this case there is a distinction between the opinion of the common man 
and that of the philosopher: whereas the former attributes the exception 
to an 'uncertainty in the causes' - that is, to chance - the philosopher 
assumes that it arises from the 'secret operation of contrary causes.' For 
the fact that he frequently discovers causes which 'are hid, by reason of 
their minuteness or remoteness' leads the philosopher to 'form a maxim, 
that the connexion betwixt all causes and effects is equally necessary' 
(Treatise, 132; cf. Enquiry, 86-7). Thus the philosopher or scientist, 
unlike the common man, ascribes an unperceived necessary connection 
even in those cases where he fails to observe a constant conjunction bet- 
ween events. Elsewhere Hume writes that 'Even when ... contrary ex- 
periments are entirely equal, we remove not the notion of causes and 
necessity; but supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the 
operation of contrary and conceal'd causes, we conclude, that the chance 
or indifference lies only in our judgment on account of our imperfect 
knowledge, not in the things themselves, which are in every case equally 
necessary, tho to appearance not equally constant or certain {Treatise 
403-4; my italics). In the Treatise Hume tried to argue that this scientific 
belief in universal necessity is indirectly rooted in natural principles of 
differently than he does in the statements of his empiricist principle (see especial- 
ly Enquiry, 22). He seems to have an alternative 'intentional' conception of 
meaning. Michael Williams remarks that we need to consider 'that "meaning" is 
by now a technical notion in a way that it never was for Hume. Accordingly ... 
although Hume regards various terms as "insignificant," it is far from clear that 
such terms are thought of as entirely devoid of "meaning" 
' (Williams, 'Hume's 
Criterion of Meaning,' 276). The interesting thing about the passage under 
discussion is that Hume regards words like 'power' as having a meaning, even 
though they are meaningless according to the empiricist principle. 
45 Compare here Berent Enc, 'Hume on Causal Necessity: A Study from the 
Perspective of Hume's Theory of the Passions,' History of Philosophy Quarterly 
2 (1985), 235-56, who discusses the non-representative character of the idea of 
causality in Hume's account. 
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the human mind. Nevertheless, it is clear that he assumes that scientific 
reasoning, unlike the reasoning of everyday life, is guided by a belief in 
an unperceived universal necessity. 
Hume's account of scientific discovery - which is based throughout 
on a belief in a hidden causal necessity - is a plausible one. For example, 
according to this account an unscientific person would say that it is just a 
matter of chance that the tail section of a certain aeroplane has broken 
off during flight. But the scientifically minded person - that is, the ex- 
perimental natural philosopher - will continue to assume that the stress 
tests that have been done indicate some necessary connection between 
the fact that steel has been prepared in a certain way and the fact that it 
will withstand certain amounts of pressure. He will not merely say that 
his earlier judgment was fallible; he will insist that there really is some 
power or force in the steel which allows it to stand up under so much 
pressure. Thus he will look for a hidden causal factor which is operating 
in the case where the steel has buckled. Is there some difference in the 
steel that was used in the tests than that which was used in the actual 
aeroplane? Were there unusual pressure conditions which would account 
for the fact that the steel has buckled in the exceptional case? And so on. 
Because he assumes that there are unperceived necessary connections 
between the cause and the effect, even where there is an exception to a 
general regularity, the philosopher will look for some hidden difference 
in the cause in the exceptional case. Thus he might discover a certain 
change in the structural properties of steel after ten continuous years of 
use that will cause it to lose its original rigidity. On Hume's view the 
discovery of such a hidden cause results from the supposition that there 
is an absolute necessity in nature, even where an established regularity 
fails to hold. 
Of course, Hume's academic scepticism does not stop here. It is not 
merely that we have not yet discovered the actual power by which causes 
produce their effects; Hume holds that we probably never will discover 
this power. In his Enquiry Hume wrote that the 'ultimate springs and 
principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elastici- 
ty, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; 
these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever 
discover in nature' (Enquiry, 30). At bottom, Hume's causal scepticism 
does not rest on what is sometimes called his fallibalism - I seriously 
doubt that Hume suspected that exceptions would ever be found to the 
laws discovered by Newton - but rather in his belief that the real power 
and force of nature cannot be comprehended by human beings. Yet 
Hume also stresses that the absence of awareness of the real power 
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should not hinder us in our ascription of that power. In his Treatise he 
wrote that 'the cohesion of the parts of matter arises from natural and 
necessary principles, whatever difficulty we may find in explaining them' 
(Treatise, 401). And, more generally, in his Enquiry he writes that It is 
universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a 
necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined 
by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular cir- 
cumstances, could possibly have resulted from it' (Enquiry, 82). This is a 
belief which is not in any way threatened by Hume's academic scep- 
ticism. His aim in the chapters from which I have just quoted is merely to 
insist that the regularity we discover in human affairs is sufficient to in- 
dicate a similar necessity in human behaviour. 
It is tempting to say that the supposition of power and efficacy can 
easily be eliminated from Hume's philosophy, even though he himself 
never did eliminate it. At the very least, it will be said, there is no loss in 
regarding as 'Humean' a philosopher who is agnostic about the existence 
of such a power. It will be said that, since Hume himself admits that one 
is aware of nothing more than constant conjunction, the belief in the hid- 
den causal necessity falls out as irrelevant. 
The problem with such a point of view is, I believe, that it leads us 
away from what is really central in the philosophy of Hume himself. In 
the first place, it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Hume's 
own attitude toward 'scepticism.' In the second, it leads to a 
misunderstanding of Hume's conception of scientific method. In the third 
place, it fails to take into account Hume's role in those eighteenth- 
century theological debates which were so central to his own philosophy. 
Let me briefly consider each of these points. 
I have already noted Hume's own stress on the fact that 'agnosticism' 
on basic metaphysical propositions is not possible: on questions of fun- 
damental ontology, mitigated scepticism is not a matter of 'suspension of 
belief.' No matter how refined our reflection, we are in fact dependent on 
natural suppositions imposed on us by our imagination. That is a central 
point of Hume's philosophy of the understanding. According to Hume, 
the judgment of objective necessary connection forms a fundamental and 
ineliminable part of our natural supposition of causality. 
Secondly, Hume's own theory and practice of science reveal his belief 
that discovery involves a good deal more than an attempt to uncover 
general correlations. In the passage on scientific method which I have 
discussed, Hume conceives of the search for hidden causes as the search 
for mechanical ones. Mechanical models played a key role in Hume's 
identification of the principles of the imagination in the Treatise. 
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Moreover, unlike his contemporaries such as Berkeley and Reid, Hume 
stressed and approved of the role of hypotheses in science. This is 
nowhere more evident than in his approval of Newton's aether 
hypothesis, which he initially took to involve the postulate of an active 
matter.46 I think that it is clear that Hume thought that modern science 
had revealed the natural and necessary principles of nature to some ex- 
tent. 
Finally, the view that causality amounts to no more than lawlike 
regularity obscures the whole role that his theory of causality played in 
eighteenth-century theological debate. The standard view - accepted by 
Clarke, Locke and Newton - was that there is an obvious necessity in 
mechanical causation: a mechanical cause necessarily brings about its ef- 
fects. Clarke and Newton (as well as contemporary opponents of Hume 
such as John Stewart) held that regularities which were not reducible to 
mechanism - such as that of gravitation - revealed more or less direct- 
ly the efficacy of a free agent. Now Hume himself argued that since we 
perceive no more than constant conjunction in both cases, we have as 
much reason to suppose a necessary causal power in the second case as 
the first. In other words, there is no reason to postulate a non-necessary 
voluntary agent in the case of causes which cannot be reduced to 
mechanical ones. Now, this argument would - I think - lose its point 
unless it were assumed that constant conjunction and law-like succession 
reveal a genuine necessity in nature.47 
In reflecting on the role of the natural supposition of necessary con- 
nection in the academic sceptic's interpretation of the world it is useful to 
reflect on the origins of the account of epistemic justification which is im- 
plicit in Hume's account. I believe that this account has it origins in the 
discussion of the external world in Nicolas Malebranche's The Search 
After Truth. In that work Malebranche had argued against Descartes' 
view that the existence of the external world can be proved - that is, be 
known to us through reason alone. However, Malebranche went on to 
claim that we have a very strong inclination to judge that our sensations 
are caused by objects independent of us and that the very existence of 
such an inclination provides some justification for the natural judgment 
that we form. Moreover, Malebranche held that there is an aspect of the 
natural judgment which is false - namely, the belief that the sensible 
46 For an elaboration of these points see my The Sceptical Realism of David Hume 
15-16, 204-21, 145-7, 162-3. 
47 See Wright, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume, 163ff . 
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qualities like colour, sound, etc. are really in the external objects. Ac- 
cording to him, this aspect of our natural judgment can be proved false 
by reason. According to Malebranche's theory we have good reason to 
consider as true that which we are strongly inclined to judge as such - 
unless our judgment can be shown to be false. We cannot show that there 
are no independent objects which cause our sensations - so that aspect 
of our natural judgment holds up. Thus Malebranche says that his argu- 
ment should establish that the existence of things outside of us is 'entirely 
probable/48 
I believe that it was essentially this epistemic theory which Hume suc- 
cessfully applied in his account of our causal suppositions. There is a 
clear precedent for the link between natural supposition and 'probability' 
in the writings of Malebranche. One might say that Malebranche's 
theory of natural judgment is an ancestor of Hume's theory of natural 
supposition.49 On Hume's theory one cannot say that our natural sup- 
positions are absolutely true. Yet those suppositions which are based on 
the permanent, irresistable and universal principles of the imagination 
have prima facie credibility. We need to scrutinize them according to 
reason and, in so doing, rid them of those aspects which can be shown to 
be false. What we are left with is an interpretation of reality which has a 
high degree of probability - that is, a likeliness to be true.'50 Thus men 
naturally suppose that objects which are constantly conjoined are 
necessarily connected and that such a connection is immediately per- 
ceived. Reason shows the falsity of the second part of this natural sup- 
position. However, the first part loses none of its credibility and, accor- 
ding to Hume, provides the probabilistic basis of modern science. 
Conclusion 
I have been arguing that a 'realism' is built into Hume's account of 
both the ordinary man's and the scientist's judgments of external ex- 
48 Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, trans. Thomas M. Lennon and 
Paul L. Olscamp (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1980), 572-4 
49 On the connections between Malebranche's and Hume's theories see Wright, The 
Sceptical Realism of David Hume 64-71, 74-6, 85-6, 224ff., and C.W. Doxsee, 
'Hume's Relation to Malebranche,' Philosophical Review 25 (1916), 692-710. 
50 This is Locke's reading of the term 'probability' in Book 4, Chapter 15, Section 3 
of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
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istence and causality. I have also suggested that scientific judgments - 
those adopted by the mitigated or academic sceptic - embody a theory 
about the limits of human understanding and the way those limits are 
overcome by human nature. The mitigated sceptic of the Enquiry even 
adopts a theory of 'preestablished harmony between the course of nature 
and the succession of our ideas' which explains how through our instinc- 
tual suppositions we gain some sort of purchase on reality. According to 
this theory, nature 'has implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward 
the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established 
among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and 
forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally 
depends' (Enquiry, 54-5). Further, as Monteiro has shown, in the 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume's Philo suggests a 
primitive Epicurean evolutionary theory to explain the existence of such 
adaptive mechanisms.51 While the elements of the theory are clearly not 
totally based on reason - in Hume's sense of the term - they do give the 
academic sceptic more than practice to fall back on in accounting for the 
principles which he adopts. It seems likely that it was at least the initial 
part of this theory which Hume had in mind when he advocated his own 
'system or set of opinions' at the end of Book 1 of his Treatise of Human 
Nature. 
Since the view that there are unknown objects and powers would ap- 
pear to be incompatible with the generally accepted view of Hume as an 
'empiricist,' it is worth considering the question whether Hume really em- 
braces the view usually called empiricism. One can say straightforwardly 
that Hume is not an empiricist if that word is used to connote a 
philosopher who identifies reality with his sense-impressions. But if by 
an empiricist we mean a philosopher who argues that our judgments 
about what exists are founded on experience and observation52 rather 
than our sense-derived ideas, then Hume certainly is an empiricist. But, 
what Price called the 'permanent significance' of Hume's philosophy of 
the understanding lies in his analysis of experience itself. Hume attempts 
to show that both our common sense and scientific experience of reality 
51 J.P. Monteiro, 'Hume, Induction, and Natural Selection,' in David Norton, 
Nicholas Capaldi, Wade Robison, eds., McGill Hume Studies (San Diego: 
Austin Hill Press 1979), 291-308 
52 On page 191 of his Treatise, Hume makes a clear contrast between what we can 
say about our sense impressions and what we determine on the basis of 'ex- 
perience and observation.' 
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take us beyond the data of sense and that the process by which we draw 
experiential conclusions has its grounding both de facto and de jure in the 
instinctual suppositions of the organism itself. 
I began my discussion by noting Hume's claims in The Sceptic' and 
the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals that the standards of 
truth in scientific investigation are independent of human beings and are 
often unknown. Hume's writings on human understanding - especially 
on causality - suggest that the object, in its very essence, lies outside of 
human comprehension. In experience we gain information about the 
world without any genuine understanding of the object we experience. 
Let me close my remarks by contrasting briefly Hume's realist 
analysis of experience with that of the philosopher who undoubtably 
gave the best expression of the phenomenalist account of our apprehen- 
sion of reality - namely, Hegel. According to Hegel, 'experience' must 
be understood as a dialectical movement which affects both knowledge 
and its object. Hegel regarded experience as a process whereby an object 
previously considered outside of knowledge comes to be known. The 
previously unknown object 'in being known, is altered for consciousness; 
it ceases to be the in-itself , and becomes something that is the in-itself on- 
ly for consciousness. And this then is the True: the being-for- 
consciousness of this in-itself ... This new object ... is what experience 
has made of it.'53 For Hegel, truth is nothing more than the current ab- 
sorption of the object into human consciousness by way of the process of 
experience. The object is in a constant process of being swallowed up by 
the subject. In contrast, Hume regarded truth as invariable by human ap- 
prehension. And he attempted to give an analysis of experience in which 
the object itself is never directly apprehended. This analysis lies at the 
heart of the academic scepticism adopted by Hume in his discussions of 
human understanding.* 
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